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SYNOPSIS 
A study of various aspects of the law relating to 
charitable bodies in New Zealand with particular 
reference to fiscal privileges, exclusiveness of 
charitable objects, the incorporation of charities 
and the consequences of such incorporation. 
The main purpose of the paper is to examine one 
particular consequence of the incorporation of 
charities, that being the capacity in which a charitable 
corporation holds its general corporate property. 
Recent common law developQents provide the basis for 
the concluding analysis and the significance of this 
analysis with respect to the alteration of objects 
completes the examination. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to examine a particular 
class of charitable organisation, the charitable 
corporation, and the political and legal issues which 
arise in respect of its role in mod e rn society. The 
political issues generally apply to all charities but 
are more pertinent in respect of charitable corpor-
ations because of their greater size and influence. 
The issues to be examined include the justification 
for their fiscal privileges, the accountability to the 
public for their policies, the degree of supervision 
exercised over them and in particular the degree of 
control which they possess over the application of their 
corporate property. 
In the United States in particular, and also in 
Britain, these issues have received widespread attention 
but in New Zealand they have for a number of reasons 
attracted limited interest. 
reasons for this: 
There are four principal 
First, there is the lack of sources of information 
on charities in New Zealand. It has been observed 
f h
. . 1 
that the reason or t is is: 
Unlike the U.S.A. where public information 
about philanthropic trusts is available from 
information sompulsorily filed with the 
Inland Revenue Service, or the United Kingdom 
where at least a number of trusts must be 
l1 W i.'ffiRRR"f 
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registered with the Charity Commissioners, 
there is no statutory requirement in New 
Zealand for a trust or foundation, as such 
to be registered or to provide information 
for a public record. 
Secondly, charitable trusts and foundations in New 
Zealand appear from the information available to be 
significantly less in number and size than those in 
the United States and Britain. The largest foundation 
in the United States, the Ford Foundation, possessed 
$3700,000,000.00 of assets in 1968 compared with the 
$3600,000.00 of assets possessed by the largest New 
Zealand foundation, the J.R. McKenzie Trust. 
Thirdly, New Zealand charitable bodies have usually 
restricted their financial support to groups and purposes 
of a non-controversial nature. 
Fourt, in New Zealand the responsibility for welfare 
services and charitable funding has been largely 
assumed by the State. 
II. CHARITABLE BODIES GENERALLY 
A. Classifications 
The term 'charitable corporation' is essentially a 
legal as opposed to a functional classification. 
Included in the term 'charitable corporation' are 
various charitable foundations and trusts and various 
voluntary and welfare agencies of a charitable nature, 
- 3 -
which have attained corporate status. 
A foundation has been defined "as a non-governmental, 
non-profit organisation, having a principal fund of 
its own and established to maintain or aid, social, 
educational, charitable or other activities serving 
2 
the common welfare". An example of a New Zealand 
foundation is the Todd Foundation founded in 1972 by 
Todd Motors Limited. The net annual income is applied 
in New Zealand or any other part of the world for any 
charitable purpose or purposes according to the 
discretion of the trustees. The Foundation operates 
in the field of education, social welfare, science 
and medicine, arts and the humanities through grants 
to institutions and organisations both large and 
small. Its net assets are valued at $1,000,000 with 
its annual revene and expenditure being approximately 
$70,000.00. A foundation is generally a large and 
organised form of charitable trust although the trust 
element is not essential. 
While charitable foundations and trusts carry out 
the funding role of charity, voluntary and welfare 
agencies on the other hand carry out the more active 
service role. Such agencies are generally funded 
through either Government funding, public donations
1 
or contributions from charitable trusts and foundations 
or a combination thereof. 
B. Charitable Trusts and Foundations Under Scrutiny 
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1. Introduction 
The modern role of foundations and charitable trusts 
as tax-exempt income earners and distributors of 
considerable size and influence in the United States 
and Britain has prompted a close scrutiny of their 
operations and a revaluation of their role in modern 
societies which have developed the welfare state to 
meet their social welfare needs. 
2. Arguments Supporting Charities as Privileged Bodies 
Some arguments which have been proffered in support 
of the privileged position of foundations and 
charitable trusts as they exist today are: 
(a) They encourage our basis humanity and love for 
our fellow man. 
(b) They positively enhance society for the benefit 
of all by the relief of poverty, the advancement 
of education and religion and by assisting other 
purposes beneficial to the community. 
(c) They are able to provide support for those who 
need it. 
(d) They can generally act quicker than other agencies . 
(e) They can serve to relieve the State from expenditure 
in specific areas. 
3. Arguments Opposing Charities as Privileged Bodies 
Some arguments against are: 
(a) They merely serve to perpetuate the faults in a 
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political system by dealing with the effects rather 
than the causes of social problems. 
(b) They receive publicly conferred fiscal benefits 
without providing any controlling interest or 
right in respect of the application of its funds 
to the public in return, except by way of prevent-
ing a misapplication of funds, thereby being 
publicly assisted in shaping social policies accord-
ing to their controllers own value concepts. 
(c) They are able to compete with tax-paying bodies 
in the commercial world on an artificially 
advantageous basis due to their fiscal privileges and 
so they can operate in a way detrimental to the 
values of free enterprise, efficiency and product-
ivity. 
(d) They contribute to the erosion of the tax base by 
attracting gifts and bequests and by generating 
income which would have been taxable or dutiable 
had the body not been charitable. 
(e) They are prone to spending a high proportion of 
their budget on administrative overheads and to 
duplicating the work of other private trusts or 
that of Government agencies. 
(f) The motives of contributors to or founders of 
charities are often self-centred in origin such 
as the desire to 'buy' a good name. 
4. Conclusion 
It is the author's view that social problems arise 
partly due to the faults of particular political systems 
- 6 -
but largely due to human nature itself. The action 
of attending to such problems and of enhancing the 
quality of life generally is a positive one which 
should be encouraged and this encouragement should 
not be withdrawn merely because the possibilities for 
abuse of the charitable process do exist . However, 
abuses of the charitable process should clearly be 
guarded against so that the whole concept of charity 
is protected . 
C . The Accountability and Supervision of Charitable Bodies 
Some of the argument against charitable trusts and 
foundations has been in terms of the lack of super-
vision over their administration which exists in 
practice. Trustees or Officers of charitable trusts 
and foundations in applying the funds under their 
control are required to apply those funds only in 
the manner and for the purposes authorised in the 
trust instrument or constitution of the charity. 
The Crown as the 'parens patriae' of charities 
controls and supervises through the Attorney-General 
the proper application of charitable funds. The 
Attorney-General exercises this control through the 
medium of the Courts who have jurisdiction to make 
orders in respect of the administration of charities. 
Except for incorporated charities which are required 
to be entered in a register with details of their 
- 7 -
objects and powers and which in some cases are 
required to file accounts and reports, there exists 
• 
no official record of charities. They are not 
required to file accounts and there is no satisfactory 
means of obtaining information about their operation. 
The whole question of the desirability of establishing 
a more effective means of control of charitable trusts 
in New Zealand was investigated by the Property Law 
d . f . 
3 h . f an Equity Re orm Committee. Te Committee was o 
the view that there was unlikely to be a significant 
incidence of maladministration of charitable trusts 
in New Zealand for two reasons: 
1. The majority of charitable gifts made in New 
New Zealand are channelled through existing 
charitable organisations rather than used for 
setting up new and separate charitable trust 
foundations. Experience has shown the latter form 
of charitable gift to be the situation in which 
abuses were more likely to occur. 
2. In many cases the administration of such trusts 
is subject to audit which provides an opportunity 
for auditors to check that payments are made in 
terms of the trust instrument. 
The Committee therefore concluded in their report 
"that the benefit of the establishment of organised 
supervision would be disproportionate to the resources 
- 8 -
and manpower involved".
4 
While accountability appears to be sufficient in 
practice in respect of the operation of charitable 
bodies there is a further question which has not 
been investigated. This is the question of public 
participation in the exercise of the discretion as 
to where charitable funds are to be channelled. The 
argument for public participation is based on the 
public origin of the fiscal privileges of charity 
and the desirability of co-ordinating charitable and 
welfare funding and services. The argument against 
is that the discretion is adequately exercised in 
practice, it would involve too much manpower and 
resources, and discourage prospective charitable 
donors as well as detrimentally affect immediate 
and innovative reponses to charitable needs. The 
question of public participation in the exercise of 
the discretion as to the channelling of charitable 
funds is one which requires factual investigation 
before a proper conclusion can be reached and this 
will not be pursued in this paper. 
D. The Business Income of Charitable Bodies 
One area of the practice of charities which has been 
subject to recent investigation is the operation of 
business and commercial activities as methods to 
provide tax-exempt income for the purposes of the 
charity. While a charitable body must be established 
for exclusively charitable purposes it can carry out 
- 9 -
non-charitable activities which are incidental to and 
consequent upon the way in which the charitable 
purpose for which alone the body was formed is carried 
5 
on. It is therefore possible for a charitable 
body to carry out a business activity so long as the 
income is held or applied for the body's charitable 
purpose and the business activity is not a purpose in 
itself. The tax-exemption for the business income 
of charities is provided for in section 61(27) of 
the Income Tax Act 1976; 
income derived directly or indirectly from 
any business carried on by or on behalf of 
or for the benefit of trustees in trust for 
charitable purposes within New Zealand, or 
derived directly or indirectly from any 
business carried on by or on behalf of or 
for the benefit of any society or institution 
established exclusively for such purposes and 
not carried on for the private pecuniary 
profit of any individual 
is wholly tax-exempt. 
This can be compared with section 360(1) (e) of 
the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970 (UK) 
which provides that a charity is entitled to exemption 
from tax: 
in respect of the profits of any trade carried 
on by the charity if the profits are applied 
solely to the purposes of the charity and 
either: (i) the trade is exercised in the 
course of the actual carrying out of a primary 
- 10 -
purpose of the charity, or (ii), the 
work in connection with the trade is 
mainly carried out by b e neficiaries of 
the charity. 
The U.K. provision therefore confines the tax-exempt 
business income of charities to that derived from 
activities which are of a charitable character in 
their own right, such as the selling of religious 
books
6 
and carrying on a public school~ 
The extent to which the tax-exemption in respect of 
income from the business activities of charities in 
New Zealand applied, was publicly exposed in an article 
appearing in a 1972 issue of the National Business -
. 8 
Review . 
The article drew attention to the fact that the 
Wellington Regional Housing Trustees had been accepted 
for registration and incorporation as a Trust Board 
under the Charitable Trusts Act 1957. The trust 
deed contemplated that the Housing Trustees would 
comprise three named persons, two persons elected by 
depositors, and not more than four persons who from 
time to time might be appointed by the Trustees as 
additional trustees . The trust deed also made 
provision for the creation and incorporation of a second 
trust board. The scheme was for the Housing Trustees 
to engage in land purchase, development and sale, and 
the profits after administration costs, were to be paid, 
- 11 -
at the discretion of the Housing Trustees, to the Trust 
Board for its charitable purposes. The profits would 
not be subject to income tax and could be ploughed 
back into land development schemes to whatever extent 
the Housing Trustees thought fit. 
The result of this trust's registration was viewed as 
illustrating that the Charitable Trusts Act existed 
as a potential tax haven for property speculators, 
who sought the advantages of incorporation and tax-
exemption. However, despite the fact that the property 
development activities of the trust were described in 
the trust deed as further and incidental to the 
charitable purpose of the trust, it is arguable that 
they did in fact constitute an independent or collateral 
or even the real purpose of the trust . This proposition 
is arguable because (1) the trust is not required at 
any time during its existence to distribute any of its 
funds to charity but instead may plough them back into 
the business and (2) the decision in M.K. Hunt Foundation 
Ltd v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue
9 which held that 
in a similar fact situation the property development 
activities constituted the real purpose of the body in 
. d . . h . bl lO question, thus ren ering it non-c arita e. 
Accepting the charitable nature of such a trust however, 
is it right that its business income should be tax-
exempt when (1) it assumes the role of a business rather 
than that of a charity and (2) it provides scope for 
generous remuneration to trustees out of that tax-exempt 
- 12 -
income. The New Zealand Government is clearly of the 
view that the cur~ent position is not right. The 
Minister of Finance in his 1982 Budget Speech made 
the following statement: 
Some businesses carried on by charities enjoy 
an artificially advantageous position in the 
market through their exemption from income tax. 
Moreover there has been a recent trend for 
individual business taxpayers to embark on 
schemes to secure the tax exemption for charities. 
A typical scheme involves the creation of a 
company whose ostensible object is charitable, 
to conduct the business of a self-employed 
person. The company's net income after payment 
of substantial remuneration to that person is 
then tax-exempt. 
It is proposed to introduce legislation which 
will be effective from 1st April 1983 to ensure 
that the business activities of charities will 
continue to be tax-exempt only where the activity 
is directly related to the principal function of 
the charity concerned, or where the business 
employs that category of people for whose 
benefit the charity was originally established. 
The proposed legislation will therefore put the business 
income of charitable bodies in New Zealand in the same 
position as it currently exists in the United Kingdom. 
- 13 -
11 
One method which has been suggested for getting 
around the Unite d . Kingdom provision is for a charitable 
company to form a subsidiary company to carry out 
business activities. The profits from the business are 
donated to the charity and are tax-exempt income of 
the charitable company and deductible to the subsidiary 
company. In New Zealand however such method would be 
ineffective since donations by companies or unincorp-
orated bodies to charitable institutions are not tax 
deductible.
12 
E. Charitable Privileges 
The conferment of the mantle of charity on a trust 
or body by the law currently entitles that trust or 
body not only to the privilege of tax-exempt business 
income but to other privileges as well. 
Section 61(25) of the Income Tax Act 1976 grants an 
exemption from tax in respect of: 
"Income derived by trustees in trust for 
charitable purposes or derived by any 
society established exclusively for char-
itable purposes and not carried on for the 
private pecuniary profit of any individual". 
The lands of certain specified classes of charities 
are exempt from liability for rates under Section 5(1) 
of the Rating Act 1967. 
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Section 73(1) of the Estates and Gift Duties Act 1968 
provides that: 
"Any gift creating a charitable trust, 
or establishing any society or institution 
exclusively for charitable purposes, or any 
gift in aid of any such trust, society or 
institution, shall not constitute a dutiable 
gift II• 
Similarly Section 18 of the Stamp and Cheque Duties Act 
1971 provides that: 
"No conveyance duty shall be payable on 
any instrument of conveyance to the extent 
that the instrument -
(a) 
(b) Creates a charitable trust or 
establishes any society or 
institution exclusively for 
charitable purposes; or 
(c) Conveys any property on charit-
able trust, or to any society or 
institution established exclusively 
for charitable purposes, in so far 
as the trusteee, society, or 
institution purchases the property 
conveyed, or the trust, society or 
institution benefits under the 
conveyance". 
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It is interesting to note that under the earlier 
provisions of both the Estate and Gift Duties Act 
1955 and the Stamp and Cheque Duties Act 1954 the 
exemptions only applied to charitable trusts, thereby 
imposing the additional requirement of showing the 
existence of a trust. The use of the terms 
"charitable trust" and "any society or institution 
established exclusively for charitable purposes" can 
be interpreted as statutory recognition of the notion 
that societies or institutions established exclusively 
for charitable purposes do not always have the character 
of a charitable trust. 
As well as these fiscal privileges charities also 
enjoy certain legal privileges. For the purpose of 
determining the validity of a charitable trust, the 
Courts exempt such trusts from complying with the 
rules against perpetuity and uncertainty of objects. 
Charitable trusts are subject to the rule against 
perpetuities, which prevents the creation of interests 
in property which are too vest at too remote a time 
in the same way as any other trust, except in one 
respect, that being the case of a gift over from one 
charity to another
13 . The immunity from the rule of 
perpetuities is in the sense of a trust which has 
perpetual duration rather than that which vests at 
too remote a time. A charitable gift for the 
perpetual repair of a church will therefore be valid
14 . 
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A charitable trust need not comply with the certainty 
of objects rule in that it can be for charitable 
purposes generally, but there must be certainty of 
an exclusively charitable intention.
15 
The automatic attachment of fiscal privileges to a 
legally valid charity has been judicially criticised 
by Lord Cross in the House of Lords in the case of 
. l 16 Ding e v. Turner His Lordship in considering the 
question of the validity of a charitable trust 
commented:
17 
Charities automatically attract fiscal 
privileges, which with the increased 
burden of taxation have become more and 
more important and in deciding that 
such and such a trust is a charitable 
trust the Court is endowing it with a 
substantial annual subsidy at the 
expense of the taxpayer It is of 
course unfortunate that the recognition 
of any trust as a valid charitable trust 
should automatically attract fiscal 
privileges for the question whether a 
trust to further some purpose is so little 
likely to benefit the public that it 
ought to be declared invalid and the 
question whether it is likely to confer 
such great benefits on the public that it 
should enjoy fiscal immunity are really 
two quite different questions. The 
- 17 -
logical solution would be to separate 
them and to say - as the Radcliffe 
Commission proposed - that only some 
charities should enjoy fiscal privileges. 
But as things are, validity and fiscal 
immunity march hand in hand and the 
decisions in the Compton 17A, 
and Oppenheim 17B, cases were 
pretty obviously influenced by the 
consideration that if such trusts as 
were there in question were held valid 
they would enjoy an undeserved fiscal 
immunity. 
Lord Cross's criticism appears valid since bodies which 
satisfy various criteria and which are therefore legally 
regarded as charities are not always 'charitable bodies' 
in the popular sense of the term. A charity is generally 2 
defined in laymans terms as a bequest, foundation or 
institution for the benefit of the poor or helpless. 
The term 'charitable purpose' in law however is much 
wider than being for the benefit of the poor or helpless, 
and while a body to be a valid charity, must be for 
the public benefit, there is no requirement that the 
benefit to the public be of any particular degree. If 
18 
as has already been noted , the public or the 
taxpayer is not to have any degree of control over 
the exercise of any discretion as to where funds 
devoted to general charitable purposes are to be 
- 18 -
directed, then their financial interest in charitable 
bodies in the form of tax subsidies should receive an 
adequate return in the form of requiring a substantial 
public benefit to be conferred by charitable bodies 
which enjoy such privileges. However, such a matter 
is the concern of Parliament and not of the Courts and 
Lord Cross's attempt to introduce the factor of whether 
or not a body or trust deserves fiscal immunity into 
the question of whether or not it is a valid charity 
was expressly refuted by 3 of the other Law Lords in 
Dingle v. Turner. 
As Viscount Dishorne said: 
With Lord MacDermott, I too do not wish to 
extend my concurrence to what my noble and 
learned friend Lord Cross has said with 
regard to the fiscal privileges of a 
legal charity. These privileges may be 
altered from time to time by Parliament and 
I doubt whether their existence should be a 
determining factor in deciding whether a 
gift or trust is charitable. 
A possible solution to the problem raised by Lord 
Cross is to restrict the purposes for which fiscal 
immunity is available and to require a charity to 
spend a certain proportion of its income for those 
purposes during any particular year. 
2 
F. 
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Charitable Requirements 
For a trust or boay to qualify as a charity it must 
satisfy the public benefit rule and it must be for 
exclusively charitable purposes. These requirements 
have been defined in a substantial body of case law with 
the addition of limited statutory intervention. 
1 . The Public Benefit Rule 
The public benefit rule is comprised of three components: 
(1) The requirement that the 'benefit' to the public 
must be capable of legal proof; 
19 
(2) The requirement that the 'benefit' must be conferred 
h ubl
. 20 
upon t e p ic; 
(3) The requirement that no substantial private benefit 
accrue to the members of the charity
21 
An exception to the public benefit rule is a trust or 
body to relieve the poverty of a very limited class of 
beneficiaries, not being named or designated individuals.
22 
Examples of institutions which are not charitable because 
they do not comply with the public benefit rule are 
friendly societies
23 and trade unions
24 , because they 
are mutual benefit societies, societies for promoting 
the interest of a particular profession such as a Law 
Society,
25 and cultural societies which are established 
not only to promote a cultural purpose but also to 
'd f . b 26 provi e amusement or its mem ers. Those can be 
compared with institutions for the advancing of some 
branch of science in the wide sense
27 and cultural 
- 20 -
societies which are established to promote a cultural 
purpose and to whtch amusement and pleasure derived 
by its members is not a purpose of this promotion but 
28 
a by-product. 
To comply with the third component of the public benefit 
rule it will generally be necessary for a charitable 
organisation to have a winding up clause in its 
constitution or rules which provides that any surplus 
assets on winding up are to be disposed of to another 
legal charity or as a Judge of the High Court directs. 
The necessity for such a clause is reinforced by the 
views of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue who requires 
a charitable organisation to have such a clause in its 
constitution if its income is to qualify for the tax 
exemption under Section 61 of the Income Tax Act 1976.
29 
2. Charitable Purposes 
The second requirement of a charity is that it be 
established for exclusively charitable purposes. The 
two significant reference points for deciding what is 
a charitable purpose are the preamble to the Statute 
of Charitable Uses 1601 and the classifications set 
down by the House of Lords in IRC v. Pemse1
30 which 
divides charitable purposes into four categories: 
(1) The relief of poverty. 
(2) The advancement of education . 
(3) The advancement of religion. 
(4) Other purposes beneficial to the community 
which are within the spirit alild intendment 
- 21 -
of the preamble to the Statute 
of Charitable Uses. 
There is no general statutory definition of what is a 
Charitable purpose in New Zealand although there have 
been statutory references to and definitions of 
'charitable purposes' for the purpose of a particular 
Act. 
Section 2 of the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 defines 
charitable purpose to mean: 
every purpose which in accordance with 
the law of New Zealand is charitable; and 
for the purposes of Parts I and II of this 
Act includes every purpose that is religious 
or educational, whether or not it is 
charitable according to the law of New 
Zealand; 
Provided that in Part IV of this Act the 
term 'charitable purpose' has the meaning 
specified in Section 38 of this Act. 
Section 2 of the Income Tax Act 1976 is similarly 
unhelpful providing that '"charitable purpose' includes 
every charitable purpose, whether it relates to the 
relief of poverty, the advancement of education or 
religion, or any other matter beneficial to the 
community". 
- 22 -
For specific determinations of whether or not a purpose 
is charitable or not it is necessary to refer to the 
• 
large body of case law on the subject which won't be 
dealt with in this paper. 
3. Exclusiveness of Charitable Purposes 
Of particular interest is the charitable nature of 
societies or institutions whose objects or purposes are 
provided for in their rules or constitutions. A 
society or institution will usually be formed for a 
number of objects. If it is to quality as a charity 
its objects must be of an exclusively charitable nature. 
The issue which arises is whether an institution with 
charitable objects is nevertheless non-charitable in 
law because its objects permit expenditure on non-
charitable commercial activities. If the non-charitable 
activities are incidental to and consequent upon the way 
in which the charitable purpose or purposes for which 
the body was formed are carried on the body is 
charitable. 3
1 However, if the non-charitable activities 
represent a collateral or independent purpose the 
body is not formed for charitable purposes only and 
f . 
h . 32 
there ore is not a c arity. 
In New Zealand the cases show an interesting distinction 
in the application of those rules between companies 
which purport to be charities and companies which are 
trustees pursuant to a trust deed of a purportedly 
charitable trust . The approach by the Court in the 
former situation is illustrated by the case of 
- 23 -
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M.K. Hunt Foundation Ltd v. C.I.R. 
In the M.K. Hunt Foundation case the appellant 
company according to its memorandum of association was 
formed to carry on the trade or business of builders, 
contractors, financiers of building schemes etc and 
the memorandum also contained provision for many other 
mercantile activities commonly found in the memorandum 
of association of commercial undertakings. The 
memorandum declared that no part of the property or 
income of the company should be paid or transferred 
by way of dividend,bonus, return of capital, or 
otherwise howsoever by way of profit to the members of 
the company, but should be held in trust for the 
Steward's Trust, an admittedly charitable body for 
charitable purposes. The appellant company purchased 
land in connection with its building activities, 
intending to subdivide it into lots and to sell the 
lots with houses erected on them. 
The issue which arose was whether the transfer of the 
land was "a conveyance of property to be held on a 
charitable trust in New Zealand or elsewhere'' in terms 
of Section 69(f), of the Stamp Duties Act 1954, in 
which case it would be exempt from liability to pay 
conveyance duty. For Hardie Boys J. to be able to 
decide this issue it was necessary for His Honour to 
determine whether the company was a charitable body 
or not. 
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As Lord Greene said in Royal Choral Society v. 
. . f 34 . h Commissioner o I~land Revenue the question of whet er 
a particular body is charitable or not is "a question of 
fact, save and so far as it may depend upon the 
construction of written documents". 
35 Hardie Boys J. 
was of the opinion that "in the case of a company, 
one must look at the memorandum of association itself 
to determine what is the dominant object of the company":
6 
The crucial consideration in the M.K. Hunt Foundation case 
was that the memorandum did not require the company to 
distribute any of its income or funds to charity during 
the course of its existence, but only required that its 
property be distributed to charity on winding up. On 
the basis of this consideration Hardie Boys J. held 
that the real purpose and object of the company's 
existence was not to carry out charitable purposes but 
to carry out the activities of a proper developer. The 
remoteness of the distribution of the charitable funds 
of the company from its business activities meant that 
it couldn't be said in real terms that the business 
activities of the company were incidental to its 
charitable purpose. 
While in the M.K. Hunt Foundation case the issue was 
whether the company itself was a charity, in 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v. Carey's (Petone and 
Miramar) Limitea37 the issue was whether the particular 
company in that case was a trustee of a charity. 
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In Carey's case the respondent company was a duly 
incorporated company and under its memorandum of . 
association one of its objects was to carry on the 
business of drapers and furnishing and general 
warehousemen while another was to act as trustee under 
any declaration of trust. Under its articles of 
association the Company was required to account 
annually for its profits to a Trust Board which had 
been set up under a declaration of trust and the Board 
was required thereupon to distribute such profits for 
charitable purposes. On the winding up of the company 
any surplus funds were also to be applied for charitable 
purposes. 
The only two shareholders in the company covenanted 
by deed to transfer to it certain shares and also 
assigned to it a certain debt owing to them . Transfers 
of the shares were duly executed, and the deed and the 
share transfers were presented for stamping . The deed 
was assessed to 'ad valorem' duty on the assignment of 
the debt and the share transfers were also assessed to 
' ad valorem' duty . 
As in the M. K. Hunt Foundation case the issue was 
whether the transfers were exempt from ' ad valorem ' 
conveyance duty under Section 69(f) of the Stamp Duties 
Act 1954 as "conveyances of property to be held on a 
charitable trust ". 
The question which arose under this issue was whether 
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the declaration of charitable trust was rendered non-
charitable because the trustee company was authorised 
to use the trust property in conducting a commercial 
business and where the income of the company could be 
used in extending that business. The Court of Appeal 
held that despite the Company's powers the property was 
nevertheless held on a charitable trust. Gresson P. 
stated the view of the Court as follows:
38 
In our opinion the fact that such wide powers 
unusual in a trustee - were given, does not 
negative the charitable nature of the trust. 
The conduct of the business is subjected to 
the dominating consideration that the income, 
when ascertained, shall be paid to the Board 
to be apportioned exclusively amongst 
charities. All the wide powers given to the 
respondent are for the purpose of developing 
the business and increasing the income yield. 
It is indeed not uncommon for trustees to be 
given such powers as to carry on farming or 
other business for the benefit of the 
widow or children of a testator; in such 
a case the whole net income from the invest-
ment is held in trust for the nominated 
beneficiaries . It cannot be doubted that 
a trust is thus constituted and if the 
objects of such a trust are indubitably 
Charitable , can it be contended that it is 
not a charitable trust? 
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The decision in Careys case has been recently reinforced 
by the decision in Cowey Mills & Company Limited 
39 
The Commissioner of Inland Revenue of Casey J. who 
quoted Careys case and held in the Cowey Mills case 
that a company acting as trustee pursuant to a Trust 
v. 
Deed created for charitable purposes is a trustee for 
charitable purposes where it is required in its 
memorandum of association to hold its assets and profits 
as trustee for charity despite the fact it is otherwise 
authorised in its memorandum to carry out wide commercial 
activities. 
On a comparison of the cases it can therefore be 
concluded that in the situation of a company which is 
seeking to establish itself as a charity pursuant to 
its own memorandum the degree of commercial 
purposes which will be considered as incidental to 
its charitable purpose will be less than in the 
situation of a charitable trust which transfers its 
property to a company as trustee. In this latter 
situation the company's commercial purposes can be 
wider than in the first situation and still be 
incidental to the charitable purpose because the 
purposes of the trustee company are always subject to 
the declaration of trust. 
The incorporation of charities and trustees of 
charities, as illustrated in the preceding discussion, 
is a convenient way of operating a charity, particularly 
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one which carries out commercial undertakings. The 
concept of incorporation with respect to charities 
will now be examined. 
3. THE INCORPORATION OF CHARITIES 
A. The Advantages of Incorporation for Charities 
Gower has stated that in the case of companies formed 
for charitable purposes "incorporation is merely a 
more modern and convenient substitute for the trust"~O 
What then are the advantages of the corporate form for 
a charitv over the trust or unincoroorated bodv? 
The fundamental conseauence of the incorooration of a 
charitable body is that the body acquires its own legal 
personality separate and distinct from its members. From 
this - separate personality a number of consequences arise. 
First, the fact that a corporation is a separate 
juristic person means that its members are not liable 
for its debts. If the corporation is a company 
registered under the Companies Act 1955 however, such 
a company must have either unlimited liability in 
respect of its members or liability limited by shares 
or by guarantee. In the case of charitable companies 
they will usually be formed as companies limited by 
guarantee since the public benefit rule precludes the 
members of a charity from acquiring any private benefit, 
which is usually the object of the share. Where 
companies are limited by guarantee the members 
- 29 -
are required to contribute a specified amount towards 
the assets of the company in the event of its being 
wound up. This position may be contrasted with that 
in respect of the unincorporated charitable association. 
Liability forthe debts of such an association falls 
on those persons who are the trustees of the association's 
property. 
Secondly a corporate charity is able to hold its property 
in its corporate capacity separate and distince from the 
property of the members. In an unincorporated charity 
the property of the association is held on trust and 
dealt with according to the conditions of its bequest or 
transfer, which will usually be according to the purposes 
of the association. Where a number of trustees hold the 
legal interest to the property a number of complications 
arise. Firstly the trustees, unless themselves 
incorporated bodies, will ultimately have to be changed 
and secondly all dealings in the associations property 
will require the consent of at least a majority of the 
trustees. This second complication will be especially 
inconvenient if the charity is carrying out commercial 
dealings on a regular basis, with the result that most 
such charities are either themselves incorporated or 
their property is held by an incorporated trustee. 
Prima facie, an incorporated body holds its general 
property both legally and beneficially but in the case of 
charitable corporations, the application of the trust 
concept to such bodies has caused some confusion with 
respect to how a charitable corporation holds its 
general property. This issue will be discussed 
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later in the paper. The change of members of a 
charitable corpor~tion leaves its property unaffected 
and the claims of the corporations property will be 
merely against its own property as distinct from that 
of its officers and members. 
Thirdly, a corporate charity is able to sue and be sued 
in its corporate name. Trustees may sue and be sued on 
behalf of or as representing the property of which they 
are trustees.
41 Where the members of an unincorporated 
charity wish to take an action they are limited to taking 
a 'representative action' where they are a group of 
h . 
h . 42 
persons aving t e same interest. 
A fourth advantage of incorporation is that the corporate 
body as an artificial person has perpetual succession, 
subject to its dissolution, unaffected by the death or 
incapacity of its members or officers. In the case of 
an unincorporated body its life depends on that of its 
members because they individually make up the body. 
These are the principal advantages of incorporation for 
a charity but there are disadvantages as well, the 
principal disadvantages being the formality, publicity 
and expense associated with incorporation. Incorporation 
is a status granted by statute. In the case of charities 
there are four methods of incorporation by statute and 
the degree of formality, publicity and expense associated 
with their incorporation depends upon the particular 
method used. 
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B. The Methods of Incorporating Charities 
A charitable corporation may be cre ated in New Zealand 
by one of four methods: 
(1) Incorporation under the Companies Act 1955; 
(2) Incorporation under the Incorporated 
Societies Act 1908; 
(3) Incorporation under the Charitable Trusts 
Act 1957; 
(4) Incorporation by Special Act of Parliament. 
1. Incorporation Under the Companies Act 
The substantive requirements for incorporation under 
the Companies Act 1955 are provided for in section 
13(1) which states : 
Any 7 or more persons associated for any 
lawful purpose may, by subscribing their 
names to a memorandum of association and 
otherwise complying with the requirements 
of this Act in respect of registration, 
form an incorporated company with or 
without limited liability. 
In the case of a private company only 2 persons are 
. d 43 require . 
Charitable companies are expressly contemplated as being 
capable of being formed under the Companies Act 
by virtue of section 33(1) of the 
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which provides that such companies may apply to the 
Governor-General to have the word "Limited" dispensed 
from their name. Apart from this provision the 
Companies Act makes no express distinction between 
charitable and non-charitable companies. 
The formal requirements of incorporation under the 
Companies Act include providing a sufficiently detailed 
f 
. . 44 d . 1 f 
. . 45 
memorandum o association an artic es o association 
having a registered office
46 , keeping a register of its 
members
47 appointing at least 2 directors in the case of 
48 
a public company and at least 1 director in the case 
f 
. 49 . . so d o a private company , appointing a secretary an 
k . 
. f . d. d . 51 eeping a register o its irectors an secretaries. 
The publicity involved in being registered as a company 
under the Companies Act is mainly through having the 
details of its memorandum of association, articles of 
association, date of incorporation, indebtedness, 
directors, secretary, shareholding and financial account
s 
held by the Registrar of Companies for public inspection
. 
1 
. 52 
A company must al~;c hold an annual genera meeting 
keep full and proper books of account
53 and have its 
d . d 54 accounts au ite . 
The fee payable for the registration of a company is 
$130.00.
55 
2. Incorporation Under the Incorporated Societies Act 
Before any society can be incorporated under the 
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Incorporated Societies Act 1908, it must comply wit
h 
both the substantjve and procedural requirements of
 the 
Act: 
Any society consisting of not less than 15 
persons associated for any lawful purpose 
but not for pecuniary gain may, on applic-
ation being made to the Registrar in 
accordance with this Act, become incorporated 
as a society under this Act. 
An association formed for charitable purposes is cl
early 
associated for lawful purposes and not for pecuniar
y 
gain, which in this context means for the pecuniary
 gain 
of the members. 
The procedural requirements are set out in section 
7 of 
the Act which requires two copies of the rules of t
he 
society with an application for incorporation in th
e 
prescribed form thereon, signed and attested in the
 
proper manner. Also required are the prescribed fe
e and 
a statutory declaration made by an officer of the s
ociety 
or by a solicitor to the effect that a majority of 
the 
members of the society have consented to the applic
ation, 
and the society have consented to the application, 
and 
that the rules so signed or sealed are the rules of
 the 
society. 
The publicity associated with incorporation as an 
incorporated society involves disclosure of its rul
es 
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and registered office through the Registrar of 
Incorporated Societies who may also require a register . 
of members 
56 and financial statement
57 to be delivered. 
The fee for registering an incorporated society is $20
5 ~ 
3. Incorporation Under the Charitable Trusts Act 
The substantive requirements to be oberserved by any 
trustees or society wishing to be incorporated as a 
Board under the Charitable Trusts Act 1957 are that the 
trustees must be trustees of a trust which is exclusively
 
. . 1 h . bl 
59 
or principa ly for c arita e purposes or in the case 
of a society, the society must exist exclusively or 
principally for charitable purposes. 
60 
The procedural requirements under the Charitable Trusts 
Act in respect of trustees are that they must make an 
application for incorporation in the prescribed form 
signed by a majority of the trustees, and if they are 
trustees for the general purposes of any society then 
that society must not be incorporated and the society 
h . 
h . . 61 
must aut orise t e incorporation. In respect of a 
society an application for incorporation must be made 
in the prescribed form signed by not less than 5 members 
of the society or by a majority of the trustees of the 
society. The society or its trustees must not be 
incorporated and the application must be authorised by 
the society .
62 In addition the applications for 
incorporation must be properly signed and attested and 
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have annexed to them copies of the relevant documents 
regarding the tru~tes on which any property is held by 
the applicant, and in the case of a society, its rules 
or constitution. 
The details of a board of trustees or of a society 
incorporated under the Charitable Trusts Act, which are 
supplied on the application for incorporation are open 
for public inspection. However, such an incorporated 
body is not required to keep accounts or make an 
annual financial statement. A further advantage is 
63 
that incorporation under the Act is exempt from fees. 
4. Incorporation By Special Act of Parliament 
A charity can be incorporated by its own special Act of 
Parliament which may be either a public or a private 
Act. Publicly created bodies such as the Maori 
Education Foundation are created by public Acts whereas 
private bodies such as family trusts or church organis-
. 64 k b . d b . ations can see to e incorporate y private Act. 
In the latter case the body seeking to be incorporated 
will need to draft its own Bill and submit it to 
Parliament via its local M.P. 
5. A Comparison of Methods 
It is clear that in respect of the three first mentioned 
methods of incorporation for charities, incorporation 
under the Companies Act involves the greatest formality, 
publicity and expense while incorporation under the 
Charitable Trusts Act involves the least formality, 
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publicity and expense. This ranking in respect of 
incorporation under the Companies Act, the Incorporated 
Societies Act and the Charitable Trusts Act reflects 
the width of the substantive requirements associated 
with each Act. 
Where a charity has been incorporated, an interesting 
issue is the capacity in which it holds its general 
property. 
paper 
This will now be examined in Part 4 of the 
4. THE PROPERTY OF CHARITABLE CORPORATIONS 
A. The Methods By and Capacity In Which Charitable 
Corporations Acquire Property 
1. Sources of Property 
There are a number of sources of property for charitable 
corporations. These are: 
2 • 
(a) Members contributions. 
(b) Public donations. 
(c) Government Grants. 
(d) Investment and business income. 
(e) Transfers for consideration. 
Legal Methods of Transfer 
There are three legal methods by which such bequests 
gifts or transfers can be made to a charitable cor?oration 
(a) The Unconditional Method 
First, there is the unconditional bequest, gift or 
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transfer of property to a charitable corporation which 
it takes absolutely as a juristic person. ·The distinction 
• 
b e tween gifts to unincorporated and incorporated charities 
was explained by Buckley J. in the case of Re Vernons 
·11 65 Wi Trusts . . d h 66 His Honour state tat: 
Every bequest to an unincorporated charity by 
name without more must take effect as a gift 
for a charitable purpose. No individual or 
aggregate of individuals could claim to take 
such a bequest beneficially. If the gift 
is to be permitted to take effect at all, it 
must be as a bequest for a purpose, i.e. that 
charitable purpose which the named charity 
exists to serve. A bequest which is in terms 
made for a charitable purpose will not fail 
for lack of a trustee but will be carried into 
effect either under the sign manual or by 
means of a scheme. A bequest to a named 
unincorporated charity however, may on its true 
interpretation show that the testator's 
intention to make the gift at all was dependant 
on the named charitable organisation being 
available at the time when the gift takes 
effect to serve as the instrument for applying 
the subject-matter of the gift to the charities 
purpose for which it is by inference given. 
If so and the named charity ceases to exist 
in the lifetime of the testator, the gift fails 
67 
(Re Ovey, Broadbent v. Barron ) 
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A bequest to a corporate body, on the other 
hand, takes effect simply as a gift to that 
body beneficially, unless there are circum-
stances which show that the recipient is to 
take the gift as a trustee. There is no 
need in such a case to infer a trust for 
any particular purpose . The objects to 
which the corporate body can properly apply 
its funds may be restricted by its constit-
ution, but this does not necessitate 
inferring as a matter of construction of 
the testator's will a direction that the 
bequest is to be held in trust to be applied 
for those purposes: the natural construction 
is that the bequest is made to the corporate 
body as part of its general funds, that is 
to say, beneficially and without the 
imposition of any trust. That the testator's 
motive in making the bequest may have 
undoubtedly been to assist the work of the 
incorporated body would be insufficient to 
create a trust. 
The donor or transferor in this unconditional situation 
prima facie runs the risk that by not imposing any 
trust obligation on the application of the property 
given or transferred the charitable corporation may 
change its constitution to include non-charitable 
purposes and apply that property for those non-charitable 
purposes. However it may be that while the charitable 
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corporation does not take that property on trust it 
nevertheless hold~ that propety as part of its general 
assets on trust for the charitable purposes in its 
constitution. The question of the existence and the 
extent of this obligation will be examined later but 
the distinction between the taking of a specific gift 
and the holding of general assets, by a corporate 
charity was clearly made in Re Vernons Will Trusts 
where Buckley J., after stating that a corporate charity 
takes an unconditional gift absolutely continued
68 . 
Whether and how far it would be right to 
regard the funds of the incorporated 
guild as subject to a charitable trust, 
I do not pause to consider, beyond pointing 
out that any assets which it took over 
from the unincorporated guild would 
appear to have been subject to such a 
trust. Trust or no trust, however, it is 
true to say that the assets of the 
incorporated guild were all effectually 
dedicated to charity. 
(b) The Transfer Subject to a Moral Obligation 
A second method which has been advanced in an article 
b . k 6
9 y Ric ett : 
arises on the transfer of property absolutely 
to a natural or juristic person, where the 
right of absolute discretionary use (existing 
in law) is limited by the presence of a moral 
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or non-legal obligation to the transferor 
from the transferee. 
Such a "moral or non-legal obligation" would have to 
arise through an unexpressed understanding which is 
assumed because of the values attributed to the 
transferor and the transferee since any expression of 
an intention on the part of the transferor to make the 
gift on transfer for certain purposes would be sufficient 
to create a trust. 
3. The Transfer Subject to a Trust 
The third method is where a donor or transferor of 
property to a charitable corporation expressly makes the 
gift or transfer subject to the condition that it be 
applied for certain specified charitable purposes, in 
which case the charitable corporation only holds the 
legal interest in the property as trustee. 
B. The Requirements of a Valid Trust 
Before a valid trust can be constituted there must 
be "sufficient words to raise it; a definite subject 
and a certain or ascertained object". 
70 These three 
requirements are usually referred to as the three 
certainties - certainty of words, certainty of subject 
and certainty of object. Charitable trusts like 
ordinary trusts require certainty of words and certainty 
of subject but they constitute an exception to the 
rule that the objects of a trust must be certain. A 
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A charitable trust merely requires certainty of an 
exclusively charitable intention . • 
A trust is generally created when the settlor by 
words of an imperative nature manifests an intention 
to create a trust by irrevocably devoting the beneficial 
interest in his property to specified persons or 
purposes so as to exclude all beneficial interest to 
himself . 
72 In the case of a charitable trust the 
spec i fied persons or purposes will be of a exclusively 
charitable nature. 
The instruments commonly used to create a charitable 
trust are trust deeds and wills . In the first case 
the trust is an intervivos trust created by a specific 
trust instrument declaring that certain property is 
to be he l d on trust for charitable purposes. In the 
second case the trust is a testamentary trust created 
by the terms of the will stating that a specific bequest 
is to be held on trust for charitable purposes . 
C . Trust And Contract 
The question which arises in respect of property 
acquired by a charitable corporation from its members 
in accordance with its constitution is whether the 
terms of such a constitution, establishing the corpor-
ation for exclusively charitable purposes create a 
charitable trust in respect of such property . 
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It is doubtful in the absence of an express declaration 
of trust in respect of the property acquired from 
members and a specifc identification of the nature 
and value of the property, whether such acquisitions 
exhibit the necessary certainty of words and certainty of 
subject. 
In the case of a charitable company incorporated under 
the Companies Act 19 5 5 , the memorandum and articles 
constitute a contract between the company and each 
73 member. In the case of a charitable company this is 
clearly a contract for the benefit of third persons. 
The cases show however , that the Courts will not imply 
a trust in a contract for the benefit of third persons 
where an intention to create one cannot be discovered 
in the surrounding circumstances. 
M.R. said in Re Schebsman
74 : 
Thus Lord Greene 
It is not legitimate to import into the 
contract the idea of a trust where the 
parties have given no indication that 
such was their intention. To interpret 
this contract as creating a trust could, 
in my judgment, be to disregard the 
dividing line between the case of a trust 
and the simple case of a contract made 
between two persons for the benefit of 
a third . 
. h d . d76 And in t e same case u Parcq L . J . sai : 
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It is true that, by the .use possibly of 
unguarded language therefore a person may 
create a trust, as Monsieur Jourdain talked 
prose, without knowing it, but unless an 
intention to create a trust is clearly 
to be collected from the language used and 
the circumstances of the case, I think that 
the Court ought not to be astute to discover 
indications of such an intention. I have 
little doubt that in the present case both 
parties (and certainly the debtor)intended 
to keep alive their common law right to 
vary consensually the terms of the obligation 
undertaken by the company, and if circumstances 
had changed in the debtor's life-time 
injustice might have been done by holding 
that a trust had been created and that those 
terms were accordingly unalterable. 
In the case of a non-charitable company the memorandum 
and articles do not ereate any trust obligation over 
76 
the company's property and unless they provide for 
something to the contrary, they contemplate being 
subject to section 18 of the Companies Act which entitles 
a company to change its objects. Similar considerations 
apply in the case of other charitable corporations not 
subject to an express declaration of trust in their 
memorandum. 
Where the terms by which a charitable corporation acquires 
its general property do not create a charitable trust 
D. 
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do the special considerations which apply to charities 
mean that the Courts will nevertheless provide that 
the general assets of a charitable corporations are 
held on trust? 
The Nature of a Charitable Corporations Obligations 
to Charity 
1. The Construction Industry Training Board Case 
The special consideration which is applicable to 
charities is the protective role of the Crown which is 
exercisable through the Courts. The nature of the 
Crown's role and the jurisdiction of the Courts as it 
applies to charitable corporations was specifically 
examined in the English case of Construction Industry 
77 
Training Board v. Attorney-General. 
The facts of the case were that the Board was created 
as a body corporate by statutory instrument made under 
the Industrial Training Act 1964 (U.K.) and its 
functions under Section 2(1) of the Act, were to make 
provision for the training of persons employed or to be 
employed in the construction industry and for research 
into matters relating to such training. Under the Act 
financial grants to the Board , investments of any 
money made by it , proposals for the exercise of its 
functions and the appointment of its members , were 
under the control of the Minister of Labour who was 
empowered to amend or revoke any order or to wind up 
training boards and to make provision for the application 
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of surplus moneys. 
The Board submitted an application to the Department 
of Education and Science for registration as a charity 
under the Charities Act 1960 (U.K.). The application 
was refused on the ground that an essential element 
of a charity, as defined by section 45(1) of the 
Charities Act was that it was controlled by the High 
Court in the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction with 
respect to charities and that that essential element 
was lacking . 
The Court was required to consider first the nature of 
the Court's jurisdiction with respect to charities, 
second whether the Construction Industry Training Board 
was a charity of a nature which came within such 
jurisdiction and thirdly whether the provisions of the 
Industrial Training Act operated to oust this jurisdiction . 
It was the view of the Court that the jurisdiction of the 
Co urts with respect to the proper application of charitable 
funds was a branch of the Courts jurisdiction in relation 
t o trusts . The Training Board was however a charitable 
corporation not subject to any express or implied trust. 
However , the Court in the Construction Industry Training 
Board case was of the view that charitable funds were 
held in ' trust ' in the sense of the application of the 
Court ' s jurisdiction even where no express or implied 
trust was created. 
78 
Buckley J. stated that : 
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Where funds are given for charitable 
purposes in circumstances in which 'no 
express or implied trust is created, 
the Crown can regulate the application 
of these funds by means of a scheme 
under the sign manual. Where the Crown 
invokes the assistance of the Courts 
for such purposes, the jurisdiction 
which is invoked is I think a branch of 
the Courts jurisdiction in relation to 
trusts. 
Buckley J. refers to examples of the Courts jurisdic
tion 
. h h . . d h . h 
79 
wit respect to c arities an ten continues t us
: 
In every such case the Court would be acting 
upon the basis that the property affected is 
not in the beneficial ownership of the 
persons or body in whom its legal owner-
ship is vested but is devoted to charitable 
purposes, that is to say, held upon 
charitable trusts. 
Is this statement to read as meaning that where "
funds 
are given for charitable purposes, in circumstance
s in 
whcih no express or implied trust is created", th
at the 
Court will nevertheless hold that as charitable fu
nds they 
are held upon a charitable trust and that their b
ene-
ficial ownership is not in the person or body in w
hom 
their legal ownership is vested? It is important 
in 
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reading Buckley J's. statement to emphasise that it is 
qualified by the words, :In every such case the Court 
• 
would be acting". These words show that in respect of 
the Court's jurisdiction with relation to charities, 
it acts on the basis that property devoted to charitable 
purposes is held upon charitable trusts, but that that 
does not necessarily mean that such property is in fact 
held upon such trusts. What is recognised is that the 
benefic i al entitlement at any one time, as opposed to 
the beneficial ownership , of funds devoted to charitable 
purposes is necessarily ,as a consequence of the public 
benefit rule , not in the legal owners of those funds, 
but in charity itself. It cannot therefore be 
concluded from the Construction Industry Training Board 
case that property devoted to charitable purposes is 
necessarily held upon charitable trusts, but only that 
for the purposes of the Court's jurisdiction the Court 
will act on such a basis. 
It is now pertinent to see whether this analysis is 
consistent with the earlier case law and then to 
examine its validity with respect to recent develop-
ments in the area . 
2 . The Earlier English Case Law 
(a) In the case of~ v . Special Commissioner of 
. . f 1 80. Income Tax , Ex parte University o North Wa es it 
was held that the property of the Unity College of 
North Wales was "vested in trustees for charitable 
purposes ". The College was incorporated in 1885 
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with the object of giving instruction in all branches 
of a liberal education e~cept theology and to promote 
higher education generally. The sources of income 
were - first, voluntary donations, secondly devises 
and bequests, thirdly a Government grant of 4,000 pounds 
per annum, and fourthly the payments of pupils. 
81 
It was argued by the Attorney-General that: 
the exemption in section 66 under Schedule 
A cannot be properly claimed under the 
general words 'vested in trustees for 
charitable purposes'. The college is a 
corporation and the revenue is not vested 
in trustees, except in particular cases 
such as a special scholarship. 
Cozens Hardy M.R. in holding that the property of the 
College was "vested in trustees" derives this support 
82 
from: 
83 
what Lord Herschell said in Scotts Case ; 
It cannot be doubted that property held 
by a body corporate or unincorporate 'for 
the promotion of education literature 
science or the fine arts ' is technically 
speaking, held upon a charitable trust'. 
However, Lord Herschell was specifically referring to 
the question of whether or not the purposes of the 
corporation were charitable and not whether or not the 
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property was held in trust since the property in 
· question was spec~fically conveyed on trust. Cozens 
Hardy J.R. in the University of North Wales case 
therefore seems merely to have assumed that the 
property of the corporation was vested in trustees 
where it was held for charitable purpos e s. 
(b) In the case of Re Manchester Royal Infirmary, 
Manchester Royal Infirmary v. Attorney-Genera1
84 it 
was held by North J. that the fund of a charitable 
corporation which previous to the body's incorporation 
by statute had been held in trust, was a 'trust fund' 
in the hands of the corporation as 'trustees' within the 
meaning of the Trust Investment Act 1889 and that the 
power of the corporation to invest its fund was subject 
to the Act. North J. was of the view "that the money is 
85 
clearly held on trust for charitable purposes." 
However, the two reasons given by His Honour for this 
conclusion clearly limit the proposition that a 
charitable corporation holds its general property on 
trust for charitable purposes. 
First the fund of the corporation had been held in trust 
prior to incorporation and as has already been noted 
· 1 86 h . . f h . bl in Re Vernons Wi 1 Trusts t e situation o a c arita e 
corporation taking over trust funds is a special case. 
Secondly, the investment of trust funds falls within the 
scope of the administration of charitable funds and is 
therefore subject to the Courts jurisdiction in relation 
to charities. The fund is therefore considered to be 
- 50 -
subject to a 'trust' in the jurisdiction sense of 
that term. The scope of Re Manchester is therefore 
clearly limited. 
(c) In the case of Re Dominion Students Hall Trust 
87 
Dominion Students Hall Trust v . Attorney-General a company 
limited by guarantee maintained a hostel for male 
students of the overseas dominions of the British 
Empire . The company asked by summons for the sanction 
of a scheme by which the charity (the benefits of 
which were restricted to dominion students of European 
origin) might be administered as part of a wider charity 
for the benefit of all such students regardless of their 
racial origin . The company asked also by petition, for 
the confirmation of a special resolution to alter its 
memorandum of association, with respect to its objects 
by deleting in a paragraph of the memorandum, the words 
"of European origin " which immediately followed the 
word "students" . 
The Court authorised the scheme and sanctioned the 
petition on the basis that the alteration of the terms 
of a charitable trust will be authorised by the Court 
where it is necessary to preserve the primary intention 
of the charity. The fact that the Court treated the 
charitable company as a trust was probably on the 
basis (although it is not stated) that the company 
was created as a ' trust ' in its memorandum, since it 
was named as a ' trust ', and not on the basis that it 
was established for charitable purposes . The latter 
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proposition was certainly never put forward. 
(d) I R F h P . 1
88 h d. n e renc rotestant Hospita t e irectors 
of a charitable corporation established by royal charter 
attempted to amend the by-laws of the corporation so as 
to allow directors who had rendered professional services 
to the Hospital to receive remuneration. The Court 
refused to allow the directors to make the amendment 
on the basis that they were bound by the rules which 
affected trustees. 
It was argued by counsel for the directors that it was 
the corporation which was the trustee of the property 
in question and not the directors, and it was accepted 
by Danckwerts J. that technically this was so. Never-
theless His Honour held that it was the directors who 
controlled the corporation and therefore it was they 
who were in the fiduciary position of trustees. As 
trustees they were required to make use of the property 
of the corporation "for the purposes of the charitable 
trust for which the property is held". 
89 
This case however has limited application as support 
for the proposition that a charitable corporation holds 
its property on a charitable trust . First, the case 
concerned the nature of the obligations owed by the 
officers of the charity and not the capacity in 
which it held its property. Secondly a corporation 
established by royal charter is a special type of 
charitable corporation. Thirdly the case concerned a 
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matter within the scope of the charity's administration 
and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts. 
Fourthly the notion that the corporation held its 
property on a charitable trust was not subject to argument 
but was assumed. 
(e) In Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmans' Families 
A . t. Att G 1
9° C · d 91 ssocia ion v. orney- enera ross J. sai : 
One starts with this, that the plaintiff, 
Soldiers', Sailors' and Airmens' Families 
Association, which is a chartered corporation, 
is a charitable corporation and accordingly 
is in the position of a trustee with regard 
to its funds ... Prima facie, therefore the 
funds of the Association can only be invested 
as trust funds under the Trustee Acts. 
The significant point to note from this statement is 
that Cross J. does not state that the corporation is a 
trustee of its funds but rather that it is "in the 
position of a trustee with regard to its funds". The 
reason for this terminology would appear to be that 
the corporation was not in fact a trustee in the 
technical sense since no express trust had been created. 
However it was in the position of a trustee since any 
misapplication of its funds would constitute a oreach 
of 'trust' subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts·, 
the jurisdiction of the Courts with respect to charities 
being a branch of its jurisdiction in relation to 
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trusts. "Trusts' in the jurisdiction sense must 
therefore include in its reference property devoted 
to charitable purposes for which a trust obligation 
as to its proper administration has been assumed by 
its legal owner, even though no trust has in fact 
been created. The consequence of this analysis must 
therefore be that a charitable corporation holds its 
general property both legally and beneficially but 
subject to a trust obliqation to administer that property 
in accordance with its constitution and according to 
the requirements of being in the position of a trustee . 
There have been two recent English decisions which have 
su2ported this analysis . 
3 . Recent Developments 
In the recent English Court of Appeal decision in 
d . s 1 d . . 92 Von Ernst an Cie . A . v . In an Revenue Commissioners 
Buckley C. J .. described these earlier authorities as 
giving support to the view that "a company incorporated 
for exclusively charitable purposes is in the position 
of a trustee of its funds or at least in an analogous 
' ' II 
93 1 1 h ' h l ' f position c ear y s owing t at 1e was conscious o 
not appearing to iwply an actual trust in respect of the 
property of a charitable company but that the trust 
concept applied to charitable companies in only a 
limited sense . This analysis is supported in the same 
case by Bridge L . J . who said that for the purposes of 
his own judgment he assumed the correctness of a 
submission by the Crown that " a company formed under 
VIC1 CE!A UNl'itRSITY OF WELL!NG1G, 
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the Companies Acts, though its objects may be exclu
sively 
charitable is nevertheless not a trustee of its ass
ets 11 • 94
 
This development was then reinforced in the case of
 
Liverpool and District Hospital for Diseases of the
 Heart 
95 
v . ~ttorney-General . The Liverpool and District 
Hospital was a charitable association incorporated 
under 
the Companies Act 1908 (U . K. ) as a company limited 
by 
guaran t ee with the main objects of providing , maint
aining 
and managing a hospital for the treatment of heart 
diseases and to promote research into the causes an
d cure 
of such diseases . Clause 9 of its memorandum of 
association provided that on the winding up of the 
association its assets should not be distributed am
ong 
its members but should be transferred to an institu
tion 
or institutions having similar objects to those of 
the 
as s o c iation . There was no corresponding provisi
on in its 
articles of association . A hospital run by the 
association was transferred to the National Health 
Service 
in 1948 and subsequently the association's limited 
functions as a research institute ceased. In 1
978, the 
Attorney - Gene r al presented a petition under section
 30(1) 
of the Charities Act 1960 (U. K. ) for the winding up
 of 
the company . A compulsory winding up order was mad
e and a 
liquicator appointed . The liquidator applied to
 the 
Court for directions as to whether the assets of th
e 
association were to be distributed among its memebe
rs 
or to be applied cy - pres . 
In the case of any company incorporated under the 
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Companies Act the surplus assets on a winding up by 
the Court are prima facie dealt with according to 
section 265 of the Companies Act 1948 (U.K.) which 
is identical to section 259 in the New Zealand Companies 
Act. Section 265 provides that on the winding up of 
a company; "the Court shall adjust the rights of the 
contributories among themselves and distribute any 
surplus among the persons entitlea thereto". The 
'surplus' referred to in section 265 is the assets of 
the company which remain after they have been "applied 
in discharge of its liabilities'' under section 257(1) 
of the Companies Act. 
Slade J. in the Liverpool Hospital case was of the 
opinion that this 'surplus' only included those items 
of property which under the general law were available 
for the discharge of a companys liabilities. His 
. 96 
Honour said: 
Thus they will include assets of which the 
company is beneficial owner, even though 
the legal title may be vested in other 
trustees. They will not, however, COQprise 
assets of which the company at the date of 
its liquidation was merely a trustee (in 
the strict sense) for third parties or for 
charitable purposes, even though the legal 
title may have been vested in it. 
much I think is clear. 
This 
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The issue which initially arose for consideration was 
whether "a company established for exclusively 
charitable purposes ex hypothesi holds its general 
corporate assets as trustee for the general purposes 
. . d f . 97 set out in 1 ts r.icmoran um o assocat1on". Slade J. 
after reviewing the earlier authorities on the relation-
shi? between a charitable cor?oration and its general 
cor?orate property, stated the nature of that relation-
h . f 98 s 1p as ollows: 
The expressions 'trust' and 'trust property' 
may be, and indeed have been used by the 
Court in rather different senses in 
different contexts. Examples of cases 
where the Court has used the expression 
otherwise than in their strict traditional 
sense are to be found in Lord Diplock's 
review of certain earlier authorities in 
Ayerst v. C & K (Construction) Ltd
99 . In 
a broad sense a corporate body may no 
doubt aptly be said to hold its assets 
as a 'trustee ' for charitable purposes 
in any case where the terms of its 
constitution place a legally binding 
restriction upon it which obliges it to 
apply its assets for exclusively charitable 
purposes. In a broad sense it may even be 
said in such a case, that the company is 
not the 'beneficial owner' of its assets . 
In my judgment, however, none of the 
authorities on which Mr Mummery has relied, 
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including the decision in Construction 
Industry Training ' Board v. Attorney-
GenerallOO establish that a company 
former under the Companies Act 1948 for 
charitable purposes is a trustee in the 
strict sense of its corporate assets, 
so that on a winding up these assets do 
not fall to be dealt with in accordance 
with the provisions of section 257 et. 
seq of that Act. They do, in my 
opinion, clearly establish that such a 
company is in a position analogous to 
that of a trustee in relation to its 
corporate assets, such as ordinarily to 
give rise to the jurisdiction of the 
Court to intervene in its affairs, but 
that is quite a different matter. 
Slade J. went on to say that he derived strong support 
for his conclusion that a charitable company was the 
legal and beneficial owner of its corporate assets in 
the strict sense from the following considerations: 
(1) Observations made in Bowman v. Secular 
. . . dlOl Society Limite 
(2) The general intention of the legislature 
as appearing froIT. the Companies Act 
(3) Statutory definitions which contem-
plated the possibility of charities 
existing independent of trusts. 
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The Bowman case concerned the gift of property to a 
non-charitable society~ Lord Parker of Waddington made • 
the general observation that a gift to a company to 
be ap?lied at its discretion for any of the purposes 
authorised by its memorandum is a gift which the 
company takes absolutely and his Lordship appears to 
have had charitable companies in mind when he made the 
point . However the taking of gifts of property by a 
cha r itable corporation and the holding of a charitable 
corporation ' s general assets were considered as 
102 
separate questions in the case of Re Vernons Will Trusts 
and on this basis the Bowman case could not be considered 
as a strong supporting consideration in the Liverpool 
Hospital case . 
The second supporting consideration advanced by Slade 
. 103 
J . was tnat : 
the concept of a company incorporated under 
the Companies Act 1948 which is capable 
of hold i ng any asset whatsoever benefic-
ially , but is nevertheless fully capable 
of incurring liabilities in its own name 
and on its own behalf would seem to be 
inconsistent with the general intention 
of the legislature as appearing from the 
Act . 
The third consideration was based on the existence of 
" a number of definitions in the Charities Act 1960 
which presupposes that a charity can exist without 
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• t t t t h • II 10 4 a concomi an rus in t e strict sense . 
4. Further Considerations 
The proposition that a charitaole corporation holds its 
general assets both l e qally and b e neficially and not on 
a charitable trust, yet is subject to the rules applicaole 
to charity trustees in respect of the administration of 
its funds derives support from a number of other 
considerations . 
(a) First there is the ap~roach of the American 
Courts as illustrated by the case of 
· h . - . 1105 Brig am v. Peter Bent Brignam Hospita 
where Putnam J. said: 
We should observe that the corporation 
contemplatea by the will was not to hold 
in trust in the technical s ense of the 
word the property which it might receive . 
It was to hold it for its own purposes in 
the usual way in which charitable instit-
utions hold their assets. Such a holding 
i s sometimes called a quasi - trust 
but the holding does not constitute a 
true trust. 
106 
The American position is summed up as follows: 
The truth is that it cannot be stated 
dogmatically either that a charitable 
corporation is or that it is not a 
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trustee. The question is in each case 
whether a rule which is applicable to 
trustees is applicable to charitable 
corporations with respect to unrestricted 
or restricted property. 
(b) Secondly there is the following statement 
by Ostler J. in the New Zealand case of 
Mayor etc of the Borough of Lower Hutt 
. . f S 10 7 v. Minister o tamps 
So long as the conveyance is to a corporation 
associated for a charitable purpose the 
conveyance is exempt even though the land 
is not conveyed to be held in a charitable 
trust. 
(c) Thirdly there are the New Zealand statutory 
provisions with respect to the fiscal 
privileges of charities which refer to 
both charitable trusts and societies ano 
institutions establisheG exclusively for 
charitable purposes thereby implying 
that such societies and institutions do 
not always have the character of a 
. bl t 10S charita e trus . 
(d) Fourthly there is the observation by 
Buckley J. in the case of Re Vernons 
. 109 h h . . Will Trusts tat a c arity is 
independent " from the mechanism provided 
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for the time being and from time 
to time for holding its property and 
managing its affairs 11 •
110 This clearly 
implies that the question of how a 
particular charitable institution holds 
its property is dependent on the 
mechanism by which it is created. 
(e) Fifth there is the position with respect 
to the property of municipal corporations 
in New Zealand. In the case of 
Waitemata County v. Commissioner of Inland 
111 
Revenue it was held by Perry J. that 
although a breach of the terms on which 
such a corporation held its property 
could be restrained by an injunction at 
the suit of the Attorney-General that 
this did not: 
... mean that a corporation holds its property 
on trust (in the absence of a specific creation) 
but rather being a statutory body it must carry 
out the purposes for which the Legislature has 
created it. At most it could be said to hold 
the property in a fiduciary capacity and not 
on a specific trust. 
The same reasoning applies to charitable corporations 
except that in the case of charitable corporations they 
are not always created by the legislature but they are 
nevertheless created to carry out the purposes in their 
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constitutions. 
5. The Effect of the Liverpool Hospital Analysis 
One area which is affected by the analysis of whether 
a charitable corporation holds its property on trust 
or not is that in respect of a change of objects to 
other charitable objects or to non-charitable objects. 
If a charitable corporation holds its property on 
trust then the terms on which the property is held 
cannot be varied or added to, except with the sanction 
113 
of the Court, by the founder of the trust or by the 
trustees.
114 In Baldry v. Feintuck
115 the officers of 
a university students union which was an unincorporated 
body were seeking by an amendment to its constitution 
to apply union funds to objects charitable and non-
charitable outside the objects of the union which were 
charitable. It was held that they could be restrained 
. . . h 116 
from so doing.Brightman J. stated the position t us: 
The union is clearly an educational charity 
and the officers of the union who have power 
to dispose of the union's funds are clearly 
trustees of those funds for charitable 
educational purposes. It is not, therefore, 
open to the union, by a purported amendment 
to the unions constitution, to authorise the 
use of the union's funds for the purpose of 
promoting an object which may happen to 
interest the members of the union regardless 
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of whether such object is charitable and 
educational or not. In my view that is 
really what clause 1(2) of the new 
constitution is achieving. The consequence 
is that clause 1(2) of the new constitution 
is not effective. 
An alteration of objects in respect of property held on 
a charitable trust or for charitable purposes may be 
effected under section 32 of the Charitable Trusts Act 
1957 where it is impossible or impractible or inexpedient 
to carry out the charitable purpose, or the amount 
available is inadequate to carry out that purpose, or 
that purpose has been effected already, or that purpose 
is illegal or useless or uncertain. 
The possibility that charitable companies could alter 
the objects in their memorandum of association to other 
charitable purposes or to non-charitable purposes was 
recognised in the Report of the Nathan Committee.
117 
There it was observed that:
118 
If however a company is incorporated under 
the Companies Act 1948, otherwise than with 
a licence of the Board of Trade granted under 
section 19 of the Act for the purpose of 
starting and carrying on a new charity, it 
will conduct the affairs of the charity 
under the powers conferred by its Memorandum 
of Association which may be altered by the 
members by special resolution under the 
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provisions of section 5 of the Act for 
the purposes mentioned in that section . 
• 
The funds may, then, not be held upon any 
trusts but may constitute assets of the 
company applicable for the pur?oses 
authorised by the Memorandum and be subject 
to the debts and liabilities of the company. 
Such a company may resolve to alter its 
Memorandum and a question may arise how 
this alteration affects the application of 
its funds. As the company is not obliged 
to obtain the sanction of the Court to an 
alteration of its Memorandum, it may well 
become possible for a company formed in 
this manner to carry on charitable act-
ivities, to divert some or all of the funds 
to purposes which are not charitable. In 
short, confusion may result between the 
functions of the company as a trust and 
under its Memorandum. 
In response to this observation Section 30(2) of the 
Charities Act 1960 (U.K.) was introduced which had the 
effect of placing the property of charitable corporations 
in the U.K. on a statutory trust for charity. 
30(2) provided that: 
Where a charity is a company or other body 
corporate, and has power to alter the 
instruments establishing or regulating 
Section 
- 65 -
it as a body corporate no exercise of 
that power which has the effect of the 
body ceasing to be a charity shall be 
valid so as to affect the application of 
any property acquired under any disposition 
or agreement previously made otherwise 
than for full consideration in money or 
money's worth, or of any property 
representing property so acquired, or of 
any property representing income which 
has accrued before the alteration is made 
or of the income from any such property 
as aforesaid. 
There has been no similar provision enacted in New 
Zealand. However, it is pertinent to notice tnat in 
the case of the New Zealand Companies Act changes of 
objects pursuant to Section 18 of the Act "shall not 
take effect until, and except in so far as, it is 
f . d b th C t " 
119 
con 1rme y e our. Unlike the U.K. Companies 
Act a company in New Zealand wishing to alter its 
objects must obtain the sanction of the Court. A 
change of objects by a company under Section 18 must 
be by special resolution and the change must be 
required to enable the company:
120 
(a) To carry on its business more economically 
or more efficiently; or 
(b) To attain any of its objects by new or 
improved means; or 
- 66 -
(c) To enlarge or change the local area 
of its operations; or 
(d) To carry on some business (whether 
related to its existing business or 
not) which under existing circumstances 
may conveniently or advantageously be 
combined with the business of the company; 
or 
(e) To restrict or abandon any of the objects 
or powers expressed or implied in the 
memorandum; or 
(f) To exclude or modify any of the objects 
or powers set forth in the Second 
Schedule to this Act; or to revoke or 
vary any such exclusion or modification; 
or 
(g) To sell or dispose of the whole or any 
part of the undertaking of the company; 
or 
(h) To amalgamate with any other company or 
body of persons. 
These are the criteria which the Court resorts to, 
to determine whether it has jurisdiction to confirm 
the alteration. In the case of Re Levin and Co Ltd 
121 
Smith J. stated the Courts position with respect to 
h 
. 122 
changes of objects under t e Companies Act as follows: 
The principles then, upon which the Court 
will act in confirming an alteration of 
the objects of a company are (i) the Court 
- 6 7 -
will first determine whether it has 
jurisdiction to confirra the alteration; 
and, (ii) , if the Court has jurisdiction 
the Court will then exercise its discretion 
upon principles which require the Court to 
see (a) that the rights of creditors are 
protected (b) that the alteration is 
fair and equitable as between the members 
of the company and (c) that the interests 
of those members of the public who may be 
affected by the alteration will not be 
prejudiced. 
An attempted change of objects by a charitable company 
to include non-charitable objects would be unlikely 
to come under the Courts jurisdiction to confirm the 
alteration since non-charitable objects do not by 
their very nature advance or benefit the business of 
charity. Even if such a change of objects did come 
within section 18(1) it would not be confirmed by the 
Court on the basis that members of the public who were 
to benefit from the charity would have their interests 
prejudicially affected. 
A clause in the memorandum of association of the 
charitable company prohibiting its members from taking 
the surplus assets on winding up and directing that 
they be distributed to an outside body has been held 
to be an object subject to the Courts jurisdiction in 
b . . f 
h . 12 3 
the change of o Jects section o t e Companies Act. 
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It may be that such a clause is not included in the 
memorandum but is included in the articles of 
association which may be altered without the sanction 
124 of the Court. If the articles of association of a 
charitable company were altered so that the surplus 
assets of the company on winding up were to be divided 
among the members then the company would no longer be 
charitable under the public benefit rule but the 
change would nevertheless appear to be valid subject 
to an overriding intention to the contrary expressed 
in the memorandum. 
Section 30(2) of the Charities Act 1960 (U . K. ) would 
therefore only be of little significance in the New 
Zealand context. 
Whether the Trustee Act 1956 applies to charitable 
corporations in New Zealand is an issue which has not 
been subject to judicial scrutiny but it is likely 
that it would apply for two reasons . First it has 
been held in the U.K. that charitable corporations 
are trustees for the purpose of their Trustee Act .
125 
Second, the Trustee Act 1956 deals with matters 
concerning the administration and application of funds 
and a charitable corporation is considered to be a 
. h' t 126 ' trustee ' in t is con ext . 
The effect of the Liverpool Hospital decision would 
appear to be limited to charitable companies as opposed 
to charitable corporations generally, on the basis 
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of its reliance on the intention of the Companies 
Act. However similar considerations apply to 
charitable societies incorporated either under the 
Incorporated Societies Act 1908 or the Charitable 
Trusts Act 1957 and so it may well be extended to 
these forms of charitable corporations as well. 
Due to the fact that the Liverpool Hospital decision 
draws a distinction between charitable corporations 
and the concept of the trust it may well be seen as 
part of a trend away from the trust concept in 
relation to charitable corporations . An analysis 
of the cases merely suggests that a charitable corpor-
ation is in the position of a trustee' in relation to 
its general assets for the purposes of its general 
administrative function but is not a trustee in the 
strict property sense. 
5 . CONCLUSION 
( 1) There is a need for some official central source 
of information about charities in New Zealand . 
(2 ) There should be some central co- ordinating body 
supervising charities in New Zealand . 
( 3) The public subsidisation of charities should be 
recognised by a requirement that charities apply 
an adequate proportion of their annual income 
for charitable purposes in each year . 
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(4) It is more advantageous for a charity wishing to 
carry out wide commercial activities through 
the medium of a company to make the company 
a trustee pursuant to a trust deed rather 
than create the company as a charity in its 
own right. 
(5) The new legislative proposals in respect of 
limiting the application of tax exemptions to 
the business income of charities are not only 
consistent with the position in the United 
Kingdom, but effective and justified in principle 
as well. 
(6) Of the various methods available for incorporating 
a charity in New Zealand the Charitable Trusts Act 
1957 provides the method which involves the least 
formalities, publicity, and expense1 
(7) Unless a charitable corporations property is 
subject to an express declaration of trust or was 
previously held on trust by the charity as an 
unincorporated body, then such property, partic-
ularly in the case of a charitable company is 
held by the corporation both legally and beneficially 
for the purposes in its constitution. A consequence 
of this analysis is that prime facie a charitable 
corporation may change its objects to those of a 
non-charitable nature, but this option is in fact 
effectively curtailed in New Zealand by the 
- 71 -
application of the Courts statutory jurisdiction. 
FOOTNOTES 
1. New Zealand Council for Educational Research Directory of 
Philanthropic Trusts (2 ed ., Whitcoulss Limited, Christchurch 
1978) pp xiii xiv. 
2 . Andrews Philanthropic Giving (New York, Russell Sage Foundation 
1950) p 90. 
3. Property Law and Equity Reform Committee Report on the 
Charitable Trust 1957 (1979) 
4. Ibid p 6; For a further discussion see Frater "Supervision 
of Charitable Trusts" (Wellington) Victoria University of 
Wellington 1972. 
5. 
6 . 
Institution of Civil Engineers v IRC (1932) IK . B. 149; 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Careys (Petone and Miramar) 
(1963) NZLR 450 CA 
Religious Tract and Book Society of Scotland v Forbes 
( 1 8 9 6 ) 3 TC 415 . 
7. Brighton College v Marriott (1926) A.C. 192 
8. Dennis Wederell Charitable Trusts Are Going Into Business 
(National Business Review; June 12 1972) 
9. (1961) N.Z.L.R. 405 
10. Supra p23 
11. Gower Principles of Modern Company Law (4th ed London , Stevens 
& Sons 1979) p 181. 
12. Income Tax Act 1976 s 56A (2). 
13. Royal College of Surgeons of England v National Provincial 
Bank Ltd (1952) A.C. 631 (1952) 1 ALL E.R. 984 H.L. 
14. Hoare v Osborne (1846) L.R . 1 Eq 585 
15. Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 9 Ves 399, 10 Ves 522 
16. (1972) A.C. 601 
1 7 . Ibid pp 6 2 4 , 6 2 5 
17A (1945) eh 123 
17B (1951) A.C. 927 
18. Infra p8 
19. Gilmour v Coats (1949) A.C. 246 
20. I.R.C. v Baddeley (1955) A.C. 572 
21. I.R.C. v City of Glasgow Police Athletic Association (1953) 
A.C. 380 
22 . Dingle v Turner (1972) A.C. 601 
23. Braithwaite v A-G (1909) 1 Ch 510 --
24 . Re Meads Trust Deed (1961) 1 W.L.R. 124 
25 . Re Mason (1971) N.Z.L.R. 714 
26 . Re Allsop (1884) 1 T.L.R. 4 
27. Royal College of Surgeons of England v National Provincial 
Bank (1952) A.C. 631 
28. Royal Choral Society v I.R.C. (1943) 2 All E . R. 101 
29. Staples A Guild to New Zealand Income Tax Practice (Wellington 
Sweet & Maxwell 4lsted 1980-81) para 262 
30 . (1891) A.C. 531 
31. Neville Estates Ltd v Madden (1962) Ch 832 
32. Oxford Group Ltd v I.R.C. (1949) 2 All ER 537 
33. (1961) N.Z.L.R. 405 
34. (1943) 2 All E.R. 101 
35. Ibid p 106 
36. n 33 p 407 
37 . (1963) N.Z.L.R. 450 
38 . Ibid p 455 
39 . (1982) Unreported Christchurch Registry M 443/80 
40. n. 11. p. 11. 
41. District Courts Act 1947 s 49(1); Judicature Act 1908 
Second Scheduler 65 
42 . District Courts Rules 1949 r 47; Judicature Act 1908 
Second Scehdule r 79 
43. Companies Act 1955 s 354 ( 2) (a) 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54. 
Ibid s. 
Ibid s. 
Ibid s. 
Ibid s. 
Ibid s 
Ibid s 
Ibid s 
Ibid s 
Ibid s 
Ibid s 
Ibid SS 
14 
20 
115 
118 
180 
354 ( 2) ( C) 
181 
200 
135 
151 
163, 166 
55 . Companies (Fees) Order 1980 Schedule (S.R. 1980/211) 
56. Incorporated Societies Act 1908 s 22 
57. Ibid s 2 3 
58. Incorporated Societies Regulations 1979 First Schedule 
59 . Charitable Trusts Act 1957, s 7 
60 . Ibid s. 8 
61.. N 59 
62. n 60 
63 Charitable Trusts Act 1957 s 30 
64 . The Baptist Union of New 7ealand was incorporated as a body 
corporate under the Baptist Union Incorporation Act 1923 
6 5. ( 19 71) 3 ALL E. R. l O 61 
66 . Ibid p 1064 
67 . (1885) 29 Ch D 560 
68 n 66 
G9 . Rickett Charitable Giving in English and Roman Law : A Comparison 
of Method (1979) C.C.I. 118,121 
70. Cruwys v Colman (1804) 9 Ves , 319 per Sir William Grant M. R. 
71. Morice v Bishop of Durham (1805) 10 ves 522 
72 . Knightv Knight (184) 3 Beavl48 
73 . Hickman v Kent or Romney Marsh Sheepbreaders Assoc (1915) l Ch 881 
74 . (1964) Ch 83, 89 
75 Ibid p 104 
76 . Bank voor Handel en Sheepwaart N.V. v Slatford (1953) 
l Q.B.; Bow~an v Secular Society Ltd (1917) A.C. 406 
77 . (1973) Ch 173 
78 . Ibid p 186 
79 . Ibid p 187 
80 . (1908) 78 L .J K.B. 576 
81. Ibid p 577 
82 . Ibid p 578 
83 61 L.J. Q.B. 437 
84 . (1889) 43 Ch D 420 
85 . Ibid p 428 
86 . n 65 
87. (1947) Ch 1 83 
88 . (1951) Ch 567 
89 . Ibid p 570 
90 . (1908) l All E . R. 448 
91. Ibid p 450 
92 . (1980) W.L.R. 468 
93 . Ibid p 479 
94 . Ibid p 4 7 5 
95 . (1981) 2 W.L.R. 379 
96 . Ibid p 389 
97. n. 96 
98 . 
99 . 
100. 
10 1. 
102. 
103. 
104. 
Ibid pp 392;393 
(1976) A.C. 167, 
n 77 
( 1917) A.C. 406 
n 65 
n 95 p 394 
n. 103 
179, 180 
105. 
106. 
107. 
108. 
109. 
110. 
111. 
112. 
113. 
114 
115. 
116. 
117. 
118. 
119. 
120. 
121. 
122. 
123. 
124. 
125. 
126 
134 Red 513 (1904) 
Scott The Law of Trusts (3ed Bost, Little Brown 1967), 
p 2778 
(1925) G.L.R. 387 
Infra pp 8-9 
n 77 
Ibid p 1065 
(1971) N.Z.L.R. 151 
Ibid p 159 
re Hartshill Endowment (1861) 30 Beav 130 
Re Dominion Students' Hall Trusts (1947) Ch 183 
(1872) 1 W.L.R. 552 
Ibid p 557 
Nathan Committee Report of the Co~mittee on Charitable 
Trusts (Cmnd. 8710) 
Ibid para 573 
Companies Act 1955 s 18 (2) 
Ibid s 18(1) 
(1936) N.Z.L.R. 558 
Ibid p 570 
Hampstead Garden Suburb Trust Ltd (1962)2 All E.R. 879 
Companies Act 1955 s. 24 
Soldiers, Sailors and Airmens Families Association v 
Attorney-General (1968) 1 W.L.R. 468 
Construction Industry Training Board v Attorney -General 
(1973) Ch 173. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
LIBRARY 
A fine of l Oc per day is 
charged on overdue books 
JIMll)Jli~l1iij)/illliil~ 
· 3 7212 00443445 O 


